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Abstract
Recent monetary models with explicit microfoundations are made tractable by assuming
that agents have access to centralized markets after one round of decentralized trade. Given
quasi-linear preferences, this makes the distribution of money degenerate — which keeps the
models simple but precludes discussion of distributional effects of monetary policy. We gen-
eralize these models by assuming two rounds of trade before agents can readjust their money
holdings to study a range of new distributional effects analytically. We show that unex-
pected, symmetric lump-sum money injections may increase short-run output and welfare,
while asymmetric injections may increase long-run output and welfare.
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1 Introduction
Following Lagos and Wright (2004), recent monetary models with explicit micro-
foundations are made tractable by assuming that, between meetings of decentralized
markets, agents have access to a centralized market that allows them to rebalance
their money holdings. Given quasi-linear preferences, this makes the distribution of
money degenerate — which keeps the models simple but precludes discussion of the
distributional effects of policy. We generalize these models by assuming two rounds
of trade before agents can rebalance their money holdings. This entails little loss in
tractability, and allows us to study a wide range of new distributional effects related
to monetary policy. We show that unexpected lump-sum money injections may in-
crease short-run output and welfare. We also show that asymmetric money injections
may increase long-run output and welfare.
The notion of long-run money neutrality but short-run non-neutrality dates back
to Hume and has given rise to a large body of theoretical and empirical research (see
Lucas, 1996). It is clear from this research that the answer one obtains hinges on the
trading environment and the manner in which the money supply changes. Monetary
injections can be non-neutral if prices are rigid, there are informational frictions,
transfers are asymmetric, or there is a non-degenerate distribution of money. The
problem with many of these models is that money is either assumed exogenously to
be needed for trading or, if money is essential for trade, the models are so complex
that they cannot be studied analytically.2 We think that developing monetary models
2 Informational frictions generate non-neutralities for example in Lucas (1972), Katzman, Ken-
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that allow us analytically to study non-neutrality and possible efficiency gains from
monetary policy requires constructing models where money is essential. Wallace
(1998) forcefully argues that we should construct models that explain why money is
necessary and then proceed to study how monetary policy affects the economy. Our
paper contributes to the growing literature in monetary economics that adopts this
strategy.
In particular, our model is an attempt to combine the simplicity of the Lagos
and Wright framework, as described above, with the ability to analyze distributional
effects analytically that arise in much more complicated models.3 The following re-
sults emerge. First, the Friedman rule, a policy that makes the expected return on
money equal to the real interest rate, attains the first-best allocation. Moreover, at
the Friedman rule random monetary injections are neutral. Under this rule, hold-
ing money is costless so agents are never cash constrained no matter what money
shock prevails. This differs from Bewley’s (1980) model because agents do not face
an infinite sequence of random consumption opportunities (see Green and Zhou 2004,
nan, and Wallace (2004), and Wallace (1997). Examples where non-neutralities occur because of
asymmetric injections are Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) type models, limited participation in financial
markets (Lucas 1990, Fuerst 1992, Williamson 2004), segmented markets (Alvarez, Atkinson and
Kehoe 2002), or overlapping generation models. Heterogeneity in money holdings play a role in
for example in Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Levine (1991), İmrohorğlu (1992), Camera and Cor-
bae (1999), Molico (1999), Berentsen (2002), Deviatov and Wallace (2002), Zhu (2003), Berentsen,
Camera and Waller (2004) and Bhattacharya, Haslag and Martin (forthcoming).
3 İmrohorğlu (1992) and Molico (1999) for example solve numerically for the distribution of money
holdings.
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forthcoming). Our framework gives agents a chance to readjust their money balances
after a finite number of trades. This has two consequences: it allows agents to undo
their trading histories in finite time and it makes the future predictable. Conse-
quently, in contrast to the Bewley model, the optimal quantity of money is finite,
and agents at the Friedman rule are willing to hold it since holding money is costless.
Second, away from the Friedman rule, random monetary injections can be non-
neutral even though all prices change proportionately. In particular, an unexpectedly
high money growth rate can cause aggregate output to increase. These results occur
even though injections are symmetric across agents and prices are fully flexible. We
show that these non-neutralities only exist if the injections take place at a time when
the distribution of real balances is not degenerate. Essentially what a high money
injection provides is consumption insurance. This raises the question of whether
monetary policy can be used to provide consumption insurance in a deterministic
fashion. We therefore consider a deterministic version of the model where agents
receive asymmetric transfers. We show that changes in the asymmetry of transfers
have no real effects if the rate of inflation is low. In contrast, for high rates of inflation,
such a change can raise aggregate output and welfare permanently.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. In Section
3 we discuss the agents’ decision problems and derive the equilibrium. In Section 4
we investigate the effects of asymmetric injections. The last section concludes. All
proofs are in the appendix.
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2 The Environment
The basic environment is that of Lagos and Wright (2004). Time is discrete and
in each period a [0, 1] continuum of infinitely-lived agents trade on three Walrasian
markets, that open and close sequentially. Only one market, denoted by j = 1, 2, 3,
is open at any one time.4
One perishable good is produced and consumed by all agents. Before enter-
ing the first two markets an agent receives one of two equally probable consump-
tion/production shocks. He may want to consume or produce but not both. As a
result, there is an equal number of consumers and producers in each market. Agents
get utility u(q) from consuming q > 0 in the first two markets, where u0(q) > 0,
u0(0) =∞, u0(+∞) = 0, u00(q) < 0 and u000(q) ≥ 0. In the last market all agents con-
sume and produce, getting utility U(q) from consuming q, with U 0(q) > 0, U 0(0) =∞,
U 0(+∞) = 0 and U 00(q) < 0.5 Production of q output generates disutility q. The
discount factor across dates is β ∈ (0, 1).
To rule out credit and motivate fiat monetary exchange, we assume anonymous
trading, no record-keeping and no enforcement of contracts. This is sufficient to
4 In addition of having two trading rounds before the centralized market opens, our set-up departs
from Lagos and Wright (2004) in two other dimensions. First, as in Rocheteau and Wright (2004)
we assume that all markets are Walrasian rather than assuming bilateral bargaining, since, although
one can get similar results under bargaining, this simplifies the presentation. Second, in place of
random matching agents receive preference shocks at the beginning of the period that makes them
either buyers or sellers, as in Arouba, Waller and Wright (2004).
5The difference in preferences over the good sold in the last market is a technical device we use
to ensure a degenerate distribution of money holdings, at the beginning of a period.
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make a medium of exchange essential for trade (Kocherlakota, 1998), and given that
all goods are perishable, this role will be played by fiat money. In order to study
the non-neutralities of money we want to see how unexpected changes of the money
supply affect consumption and production. To this end, we assume that the law of
motion of the money stock is Mt = ztMt−1, where zt is a random variable such that
zt =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
zH = µ
¡
1 + εH
¢
with probability π
zL = µ
¡
1− εL
¢
with probability 1− π.
We assume µ, εL, εH > 0 and π = ε
L
εH+εL
so that E (zt) = µ.
Money is injected via lump-sum transfers τ t = (zt − 1)Mt−1, after the closing of
market 1 in period t, but prior to the realization of individual trading shocks. In
short, at the beginning of the second market one of two states, denoted i = H,L, can
be realized. In one state money growth is high, zH , in the other it is low, zL.
We refer to Mt−1 as the beginning-of-period money supply for date t. This is the
money supply existing in the economy before the shock takes place. We refer to Mt
as the money supply present in the market at the end of period t, after the shock is
realized. This is the money stock available at the beginning of period t+ 1.
2.1 Sequential market trades
In period t, let pj,t be the nominal price in market j, and φt = 1/p3,t be the real price
in the last market. We study equilibria where end-of-period real money balances are
time-invariant
(1) φtMt = φt+1Mt+1.
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We refer to this as a stationary equilibrium. For this reason we omit the time subscript
when understood, and study a representative period working backwards from last to
first market, within the period. In the steady state it then follows that prices change
instantly and proportionately since
(2)
φH
φ−1
=
1
zH
and
φL
φ−1
=
1
zL
where φj is the price of money in state j = L,H.
We also have that average inflation is E
³
φt
φt+1
´
= E (zt) = µ, while the average
gross real return on money is
R = Et
∙
φt+1
φt
¸
= Et
∙
Mt
Mt+1
¸
=
1
µ
1 + εH − εL
(1 + εH) (1− εL)
≡ 1
γ
,
which is negatively associated with expected inflation µ. In our analysis we will focus
on γ rather than µ since γ is proportional to µ.
Note that the Friedman rule in this model corresponds to a policy that sets the
expected return on money 1γ equal to the real interest rate
1
β . This implies that with
a stochastic policy the Friedman rule requires less deflation than in a deterministic
model, i.e., it requires the average gross inflation rate µ to be above β. To see this
observe that µ > γ since 1+εH−εL(1+εH)(1−εL) > 1. In fact, the Friedman rule may require a
positive average rate of inflation. For example, if ε = εH = εL, then one can show
that the inflation under the Friedman rule is strictly positive if ε >
√
1− β.
Let Vj(mj) denote the expected value from trading in market j with mj money.
Let qjb and qjs respectively denote the quantities bought or sold by an agent trading
in market j. We let q∗3 satisfy U
0(q∗3) = 1 and q
∗ satisfy u0(q∗) = 1.
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2.1.1 The last market
In the last market agents can produce and consume. They choose how much to buy,
q3b, how much to sell, q3s, and how much money to take into the next period, m1,+1.
As a result, the representative agent’s program is
V3 (m3) = max
q3b,q3s,m1,+1
[U (q3b)− q3s + βV1 (m1,+1)]
s.t. q3b + φm1,+1 = q3s + φm3
Substituting for q3s yields
(3) V3 (m3) = φm3 +max [U (q3b)− q3b − φm1,+1 + βV1 (m1,+1)]
where (q3b,m1,+1) are choice variables, hence the conditions for maximization are
(4)
U 0 (q3b) = 1
−φ+ βV 01 (m1,+1) = 0.
The envelope condition is
(5) V 03 (m3) = φ.
There are two key results. First, trades are always efficient in the last market, since
q3b = q
∗
3 always and for every agent. Second, and most importantly, the distribution
of beginning-of-period money holdings is degenerate. This is because m1,+1 is chosen
independently of m3. It follows that in equilibrium everyone exits the last market
with identical money holdings, regardless of how much money they brought into the
last market. Those who bring excessive money into the last market, spend some on
goods, while those with too little money sell output.6 This feature of the Lagos and
6Conditions need to be imposed to ensure qs3 ≥ 0. See later.
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Wright model makes the distribution of money degenerate at the beginning of market
one.
2.1.2 The second market
Conditional on the realization of the shock zt, an agent who has m2 money balances
at the opening of the second market, at any date t, has expected lifetime utility
(6) V2 (m2) =
1
2
[u (q2b) + V3 (m2 − p2q2b)] +
1
2
[−q2s + V3 (m2 + p2q2s)] .
Here p2q2b is the amount of money spent when buying q2b goods, and p2q2s is the
money received when selling q2s goods.
The agent chooses quantities to buy and sell, taking the price p2 as given. Specif-
ically, as a seller, the agent chooses q2s to maximize −q2s + V3 (m2 + p2q2s). This
yields the first-order condition
(7) p2V 03 (m2 + p2q2s) = 1 ⇒ p2 = p3 =
1
φ
where we have used (5). That is prices in the last two markets must be equal and
are pinned down by the value of money in the last market. The intuition is that the
seller can acquire a unit of money in the second or the third market and will do so
at the lowest cost. Since sellers have linear production costs, if p2 > p3 it is cheaper
to acquire money in the second market and vice versa if p2 < p3. At price p2 = p3
sellers are indifferent. This also implies that they are willing to supply all that is
demanded, so the supply curve in the second market is flat.7
7With a strictly convex cost function, the first-order condition is p2
c0(q2s)
= p3. This would make
the analysis more complicated but it would not change the results qualitatively.
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As a buyer, the agent chooses q2b to maximize his expected utility u (q2b) +
V3 (m2 − p2q2b), given the constraint p2q2b ≤ m2. Letting λ2 ≥ 0 be the multiplier
on this constraint, the conditions for maximization are
(8)
u0 (q2b) = p2V 03 (m2 − p2q2b) + p2λ2
λ2(m2 − p2q2b) = 0.
We can now state
Lemma 1 Let m∗ = q∗/φ. In equilibrium, if
(i) m2 < m∗ then λ2 > 0, q2b = φm2 < q∗ and V2 (m2) is strictly increasing and
concave;
(ii) m2 ≥ m∗ then λ2 = 0, q2b = q∗ ≤ φm2 and V2 (m2) is strictly increasing and
linear.
The key implication is that trades in the second market are inefficient, q2b < q∗,
if the buyer is cash constrained, m2 < m∗. Otherwise, they are efficient. To see why,
in the appendix we show that if the constraint is binding,
(9) V 02 (m2) =
φ
2
£
u0 (q2b) + 1
¤
> φ
whereas if it is not binding
(10) V 02 (m2) = φ.
Intuitively, if m2 ≥ m∗, then a buyer spends only part of his money and carries
the rest into the last market. Thus, the marginal value of money for an agent entering
market 2 with m2 ≥ m∗ is simply φ. The reason is, whether he ends up buying or
10
selling, the agent will not spend all his balances. If the agent enters market 2 with
less than m∗, however, he is constrained as a buyer. Therefore, the marginal value of
money is greater than φ and has two components. With probability 1/2, the agent
sells so he does not spend any money and values an extra dollar simply by φ. With
probability one half the agent buys, in which case an extra dollar buys φ goods giving
marginal utility u0 (q2b).
2.1.3 The first market
An agent starting a period with m1 money has expected lifetime utility
(11) V1 (m1) =
1
2
[u (q1b) +EV2 (m1 − p1q1b + τ)]+
1
2
[−q1s +EV2 (m1 + p1q1s + τ)]
where p1q1s and p1q1b are, respectively, the amounts of money received as a seller
and spent as a buyer. Notice that agents take into account that they will receive a
random nominal transfer τ at the beginning of market 2.
As a seller, the agent chooses q1s to maximize −q1s + EV2 (m1 + p1q1s), taking
the price p1 as given. This yields the first-order condition
(12) p1EV 02 (m1 + p1q1s + τ) = 1.
Production takes place until the expected marginal value of money, EV 02 (m1 + p1q1s + τ),
equals its real price 1/p1. This money can be used to buy consumption in markets
that open later.
As a buyer, the agent chooses q1b to maximize u (q1b) + EV2 (m1 − p1q1b + τ)
subject to the constraint p1q1b ≤ m1. Letting λ1 ≥ 0 be the multiplier on this
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constraint, the conditions for maximization are
(13)
u0 (q1b) = p1EV 02 (m1 − p1q1b + τ) + p1λ1
λ1(m1 − p1q1b) = 0.
We then have
Lemma 2 In equilibrium λ1 = 0, q1b = q1s = q1 ≤ q∗, q1 < m1/p1, and V1 (m1) is
strictly increasing and concave.
The main implication of Lemma 2 is that q1 < m1/p1. The marginal value of
consuming even a little bit in the second market is very high for every agent, should
a consumption opportunity arise. Consequently, agents always want to carry some
cash into the second market.
We also have
(14) V 01 (m1) =
1
2p1
£
u0 (q1b) + 1
¤
that is, the marginal value of money at the opening of the first market is given by
an expression similar to (9). The difference is that 1/p2 is equal to φ whereas 1/p1
may not be. This possible price dispersion across markets plays a role in some of our
results.
3 Equilibria
A key feature of our model is that the idiosyncratic consumption and production
shocks generate intra-period heterogeneity in money balances. As we demonstrate
12
later, the existence of a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings is what opens
the door to possible beneficial effects of money creation in the short-run.
More precisely, every agent enters a period withm1 =M−1 money, i.e., the money
stock from the prior period (see Figure 1). Then, agents are randomly divided into
buyers and sellers in market 1. Buyers reduce their money holdings by p1q1 and
sellers acquire p1q1. Then the money injection occurs. Consequently, when the
second market opens half of the agents will be ‘poor’, holdingM−1+τ −p1q1 units of
money, and half will be ‘rich’, holding M−1 + τ + p1q1. Then, agents will once more
be divided into sellers and buyers. Since the marginal cost of production is constant
in equilibrium sellers are indifferent to how much to produce. For simplicity, we
assume that all sellers produce the same amount.8 Therefore, when market 3 opens
the support of the distribution of money will have four mass points. However, all
agents leave market 3 with the same money holdings m1,+1 =M .
8This indifference would vanish if we had increasing marginal cost. However, it would greatly
complicate the analysis without changing the basic results.
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Sequence of events
From what we have learned so far, consumption may differ across buyers only in
the second market, due to heterogeneity in money holdings. Thus, let (qpi2 , q
ri
2 ) and
(λpi2 , λ
ri
2 ) denote the values of consumption and multipliers of, respectively, poor and
rich buyers in market 2, contingent on the realization of state i = H,L. If, by a small
abuse in notation, we let q2 = (q
pH
2 , q
pL
2 , q
rH
2 , q
rL
2 ), λ2 = (λ
pH
2 , λ
pL
2 , λ
rH
2 , λ
rL
2 ), and let
m̄j denote the vector of possible money holdings at the opening of market j we can
state the following
Definition 1 A stationary monetary equilibrium is a list {pj , qj ,mj}3j=1 and {λ1, λ2}
that satisfy (1)-(4), (6)-(8), and (11)-(13).
In the proof of Proposition 1 we show that there exist critical values γ1 ≤ γ2 ≤ γ3
such that the following is true.
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Proposition 1 A stationary monetary equilibrium exists only if γ ≥ β. An equilib-
rium exists and is unique for γ ∈ (β, γ2] where
i) for γ ∈ (β, γ1], q
pL
2 < q
pH
2 = q
∗ and qrL2 = q
rH
2 = q
∗;
ii) for γ ∈ (γ1, γ2], q
pL
2 < q
pH
2 < q
∗ and qrL2 = q
rH
2 = q
∗.
For γ > γ2 if an equilibrium exists then
iii) for γ ∈ (γ2, γ3], q
pL
2 < q
pH
2 < q
∗ and qrH2 < q
rL
2 = q
∗;
iv) for γ > γ3, q
pL
2 < q
pH
2 < q
∗ and qrH2 < q
rL
2 < q
∗.
Since γ is monotonically increasing in the expected gross inflation rate µ, Propo-
sition 1 also characterizes the monetary equilibrium as a function of µ. When γ < γ2
we refer to this economy as the low inflation economy, and when γ ≥ γ2 we call
it the high inflation economy. In the low inflation economy rich buyers are never
constrained. In the high inflation economy they can be constrained. Although we
cannot prove existence of equilibrium for general utility functions when inflation is
high, we can do so for particular functions.
Corollary 1 All quantities less than q∗ are strictly decreasing in γ and approach q∗
as γ → β. Consequently, the Friedman rule attains the first-best allocation.
Corollary 1 is a standard result. An increase in the money growth rate decreases
the value of money which reduces consumption (e.g. see Lagos and Wright 2004 or
Shi 1997). In contrast to Lagos and Wright (2004) we obtain the first-best under the
Friedman rule because we have competitive markets and not Nash bargaining.
It is worthwhile to note that under the Friedman rule randomness of the monetary
policy rule is completely irrelevant for the allocation in the first two markets. That
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is the first-best is attained for any policy which involves γ → β. To see this note that
if the policy is deterministic, i.e. εH = εL = 0, then the Friedman rule requires that
µ → β. If the policy is random, the rule requires that µ (1+εH)(1−εL)1+εH−εL → β. In both
cases, all buyers consume q∗ is the first two markets. The intuition is that under the
Friedman rule, the expected opportunity cost of holding money is zero so agents take
enough money to buy the efficient quantity in both markets for all states.
Proposition 2 Shocks to the money supply are non-neutral in the short run.
Proposition 2 summarizes the main result of our paper: monetary shocks have
real effects for individual agents in all equilibria. The non-neutrality is a direct
consequence of the distribution of money holdings. However, there is no persistence
on quantities from these shocks. So all real effects are temporary. It can be shown
that random injections in Lagos and Wright (2004) are neutral regardless of when
they occur. The same is true in our model if they occur when the distribution is
degenerate, i.e. in markets 1 or 3.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. After any shock to the money
supply prices change proportionately. When money is higher than expected, the price
increase reduces the real balances of every agent, acting as a proportional tax on their
money holdings. Since in market 2money holdings are heterogeneous, those who hold
less cash are taxed less than those who hold more. This allows poor buyers–who
are cash strapped–to increase their consumption in market 2 because the lump-
sum transfer more than offsets the inflation tax. In contrast, rich buyers lose real
wealth even after accounting for the lump-sum transfer. This does not affect their
16
consumption when inflation is low because in this case rich buyers are not constrained
by their cash holdings. However, if inflation is high the inflation tax created by the
surprise injection reduces the consumption of rich buyers because they are also cash
constrained in market 2. Effectively, an unanticipated increase in the money stock
redistributes real wealth from those with more to those with less through the price
increase.
Proposition 3 Consider an unexpected increase in the money supply. For γ < γ3
aggregate output is higher than average. For γ ≥ γ3 aggregate output is unaffected by
the money supply shock.
It is clear that aggregate output is increasing in the low inflation economy since
rich buyers do not change their consumption while poor buyers consume more. In
contrast, in the high inflation economy when all agents are constrained, i.e. case (iv)
in Proposition 1, aggregate output is unaffected by the monetary shock since rich
buyers reduce their consumption by the same amount as the poor buyers increase
theirs.
In summary, the short-run non-neutralities of our model hinge on three key el-
ements. First, monetary injections must be unanticipated. Second, such injections
must take place when agents hold different amounts of money. Third, inflation cannot
be out of hand, otherwise every buyer would be cash constrained and so aggregate
output is unaffected. What our results do not hinge on are any price rigidities, infor-
mation frictions, or asymmetric injections across agents. Similar effects are reported
for example in Molico (1999). In contrast to his model, our results do not rely on
17
numerical simulations, but are derived analytically.
4 Consumption insurance
Clearly, the high money shock is welfare improving. It raises consumption of poor
buyers without affecting the consumption of the rich buyers in the low inflation
equilibrium. Although it lowers their consumption in the high inflation economy, it
also increases the poor buyers’ consumption by the same amount. Since the rich have
a lower marginal utility of consumption than the poor there is still a potential for
welfare gains from this redistribution. Unfortunately, the low money supply shock
does just the opposite. So it is hard to imagine that these random injections improve
welfare on average. From the perspective of the representative agent at the start of
market 1, a high money shock acts like consumption insurance. This suggests that
a scheme that transfers real balances from agents when they are rich to when they
are poor in all periods would be welfare improving. In the following we explore this
issue.
Let us assume that zH = zL = γ so that the money supply is deterministic. With
this process the only possible equilibrium allocations are the ones described in (ii)
and (iv) of Proposition 1. From (ii) in Proposition 1 rich buyers are unconstrained
and from (iv) they are constrained.
Assume further that the perfectly anticipated lump-sum transfer received by
agents depends on their trading state in the first market as follows. Each agent
who drew a consumption opportunity in the first market gets the transfer τpt =
18
(γ − 1)xMt and each agent who drew a production opportunity gets the transfer
τ rt = (γ − 1) (2− x)Mt where x ∈ [0, 2]. This allows us to consider, for example,
symmetric transfers (x = 1) as in the previous section, transfers only to the poor
(x = 2) and transfers only to the rich (x = 0).
Our new assumptions do not affect the equations in the second and last markets.
In the first market an agent with m1 units of money has expected lifetime utility
(15) V1 (m1) =
1
2
[u (q1b) + V2 (m1 − p1q1b + τp)] +
1
2
[−q1s + V2 (m1 + p1q1s + τ r)]
The perfectly anticipated transfers τp and τ r are new in equation (15). Accordingly,
the first-order conditions of the sellers (12) and the buyers (13) have to be modified
to take these new transfers into account.
In the following we analyze how a change in x affects steady state production and
consumption in markets 1 and 2.
Proposition 4 In the low inflation economy, changes in x have no effect on indi-
vidual or aggregate consumption in markets 1 and 2. In the high inflation economy
if γ 6= 1, changes in x are non-neutral.
Surprisingly, a change in x does not have any real effects when inflation is low.
The only effect is that the steady state value of real money balances decreases. In
contrast, if inflation is high changes in x are non-neutral.
What is the intuition for this result? Changes in x have different effects on the
relative prices across markets. In the low inflation economy all prices are the same,
i.e. p1 = p2 = p3 = 1/φ. Thus, any changes in x causes all prices to change pro-
portionately. Since relative prices between markets 1 and 2 are unaffected, market
19
1 consumption does not change. But then, by the inter-market Euler equation, con-
sumption of the poor buyers in market 2 cannot change. Finally, since the rich buyers
continue to consume q∗ in market 2, their consumption is not affected.
In the high inflation economy there is price dispersion across markets since p1 <
p2 = p3. The price in market 1 depends on the marginal value of money in market
2, which in contrast to the low inflation economy is non-linear in x. Then, changes
in x change the relative price between markets 1 and 2. As a consequence, agents
change their consumption patterns. More intuitively, an increase in x reduces the
money holdings of rich agents in market 2 and, because they are cash constrained
in this equilibrium, this increases their marginal value of money. Since they are the
sellers in market 1, they choose to sell more in market 1 to acquire additional cash.
By selling more, they lower p1 relative to p2 and so buyers find it optimal to consume
more in market 1.
We define welfare as the life-time expected utility of a representative agent at the
beginning of the period.
Proposition 5 For γ > 1, welfare is increasing in x. For γ < 1, if an equilibrium
exists, welfare is decreasing in x.
The reason welfare increases is that an increase in x provides consumption in-
surance in market 2 - agents give up consumption when they are rich but increase
it when they are poor. Given our assumptions on preferences, this insurance lowers
the expected marginal utility of consumption in market 2 which induces agents to
increase consumption in market 1.
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5 Conclusion
We have presented a framework in which a monetary expansion, while neutral in the
long-run, can have beneficial effects in the short-run. The key feature of our model
is that agents trade on a sequence of markets while being subject to idiosyncratic
shocks. For this reason, there is equilibrium heterogeneity in money balances, so
that one-time monetary transfers can be used to redistribute liquidity from rich to
poor. Since an unexpectedly high money growth rate redirects consumption to those
who most value it, welfare is positively affected.
The short-run non-neutralities of our model hinge on three elements. First, mon-
etary injections must be unanticipated. Second, such injections must take place when
agents hold different amounts of money. Third, average inflation cannot be too high,
otherwise aggregate output is unaffected. What our results do not hinge on are any
price rigidities, asymmetric information, or asymmetric injections across agents, de-
vices that have been used in the literature to generate short-run non-neutralities of
money. Finally, we show that by providing consumption insurance, fully anticipated
asymmetric lump-sum transfers increase aggregate output and welfare in the high
inflation economy. Surprisingly, such a scheme has no real effects when inflation is
low.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. If the constraint is not binding then λ2 = 0. Using (8)
then u0 (q2b) = 1. Here trades are efficient. The buyer spends q∗/φ money, and we let
m∗ = q∗/φ denote money holdings such that the constraint on spending does not bind.
If the constraint is binding, λ2 > 0, then (8) implies u0 (q2b) = 1+λ2φ and p2q2b = m2.
Here trades are inefficient. The buyer spends all his money, p2q2b = m2 < m∗, and
consumes q2b = m2/p2 < q∗.
To examine concavity of V2 differentiate (6) with respect to m2 to get
V 02 (m2) =
1
2
h
u0 (q2b)
∂q2b
∂m2
+ V 03 (m2 − p2q2b)
³
1− p2 ∂q2b∂m2
´i
+12
h
−∂q2s∂m2 + V
0
3 (m2 + p2q2s)
³
1 + p2
∂q2s
∂m2
´i
Then (7), (8) and φ = 1/p2 imply that
(16) V 02 (m2) =
1
2p2
£
u0 (q2b) + 1
¤
+
1
2
λ2
∙
1− p2
∂q2b
∂m2
¸
If λ2 = 0, then u0 (q2b) = 1 and V 02 (m2) = φ, so V2 (m2) is linear in m2 for m ≥ m∗.
If λ2 > 0, then p2q2b = m2, which implies that 1 − p2 ∂q2b∂m2 = 0. Hence, V
0
2 (m2) =
φ
h
u0(q2b)+1
2
i
> φ since u0 (q2b) > 1. Note that V 002 (m2) < 0 because
∂q2b
∂m2
> 0, so that
V2(m2) is concave ∀m2 < m∗.¥
Proof of Lemma 2. First prove that λ1 = 0 always. Suppose λ1 > 0. Then m2 = 0
and q2b = 0 implying u0 (0) = 1 + λ2/φ, which is not possible since u0(0) =∞. Thus
λ1 = 0, in which case (12)-(13) yield
(17) u0 (q1b) =
EV 02 (m1 − p1q1b + τ)
EV 02 (m1 + p1q1s + τ)
.
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If m1 − p1q1b < m∗ then EV2(m1 − p1q1b + τ) is concave, hence u0 (q1b) > 1 and
q1b < q
∗. If m1− p1q1b ≥ m∗ then both numerator and denominator are linear, hence
u0 (q1b) = 1 and q1b = q∗. Hence, q1b ≤ q∗.
Differentiating (11) with respect to m1
V 01 (m1) =
1
2
h
u0 (q1b)
∂q1b
∂m1
+EV 02 (m1 − p1q1b + τ)
³
1− p1 ∂q1b∂m1
´i
+12
h
−∂q1s∂m1 +EV
0
2 (m1 + p1q1s + τ)
³
1 + p1
∂q1s
∂m1
´i
Using (12) and (13) (for λ1 = 0) yields
V 01 (m1) =
1
2p1
£
u0 (q1b) + 1
¤
Thus, if q1b < q∗ then V1 (m1) is strictly increasing and concave.
Since everyone enters the first market with identical money balances, and there
is an identical number of buyers and sellers, in equilibrium, q1b = q1s = q1.¥
Proof of Proposition 1. The shock to the money supply is realized before the
second market opens. Thus, p2 adjusts instantly and proportionately to the change
in the money stock, and so does the expected value of φ. Then (2) implies that
φH
Eφ
= kH ≡ 1− ε
L
1 + εH − εL < 1(18)
φL
Eφ
= kL ≡ 1 + ε
H
1 + εH − εL > 1(19)
where ki is the price of money in state i = L,H relative to the expected price. It
does not depend on µ. Note that kH < kL, so when the money shock is high the
price of money is low.
Suppose first that λp2 = λ
r
2 = 0 for all states. Then q2b = q
∗ for all agents
in all states. Therefore as shown in Lemma 1 we have V 02 (m2) = φ and therefore
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EV 02 (m2) = Eφ. Then from the first-order condition of the buyer in market 1 (13)
we have u0(q1)/p1 = Eφ and from the first-order condition of the seller in market 1
(12) we have p1 = 1/Eφ. Finally, (14) implies that the marginal value of money at
the beginning of a period is equal to the expected value at the end of the period
V 01 (m1) = Eφ
This condition says that if agents take a unit of money into the first market but do
not intend to spend it in either the first or second markets, then the value of this extra
unit of money is the goods it buys in the last market. Substituting this expression
into (4), and backdating it, gives
(20) φ−1
∙
βE
µ
φ
φ−1
¶
− 1
¸
= φ−1 (β/γ − 1) ≤ 0.
For β/γ < 1 this expression is negative implying m1 = 0 which cannot be an equi-
librium. For β/γ > 1 agents want to hold an infinite amount of money, since its rate
of return is greater than the discount rate. This also cannot be an equilibrium. For
β/γ = 1, there is an infinity of monetary equilibria, one for each value of φ−1.
Suppose λr2 > λ
p
2 = 0 in one or both states. From (8) this is a contradiction since
m2 is larger for rich agents.
Now consider the remaining possibilities.
Equilibrium 1: λpL2 > 0 and λ
pH
2 = λ
rL
2 = λ
rH
2 = 0. In this case, q
pH
2b =
qrH2b = q
rL
2b = q
∗ and qpL2b < q
∗. First, we determine q1. As shown in Lemma 1,
V 02 (m1 + p1q1s + τ) = φ, thus EV
0
2 (m1 + p1q1s + τ) = Eφ. Using (12), we have
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p1 = 1/Eφ. Next, (14) implies that
2V 01 (m1) = Eφ
£
u0 (q1) + 1
¤
Finally, (4) can be backdated to get
2φ−1
β
= Eφ
£
u0 (q1) + 1
¤
.
Since 1/γ = Eφ/φ−1 then
(21) u0 (q1) = 1 + 2
µ
γ − β
β
¶
Because of strict concavity of u(q) there is a unique value q1 that solves (21), and for
β < γ, q1 < q
∗. As γ → β, u0 (q1)→ 1 and q1 → q∗.
Next we determine the real money balances Ω. Using (17) and noting that qpL2b =
φLML − kLq1 where φLML = Ω we get
(22) 2u0 (q1) = (1− π) kL
£
u0
¡
Ω− kLq1
¢
+ 1
¤
+ 2πkH
For a given value of q1, it is straightforward to show that a unique value of Ω exists.
It then follows that since the poor buyer spends all of his money in markets one
and two, when the state is i = L, with ML = zLM−1 we have q
pL
2b = Ω−kLq1. Then,
φL =
Ω
ML
, φH =
Ω
MH
and 1/p1 = (1− π)
Ω
ML
+ π
Ω
MH
.
Finally, for this equilibrium to exist it must be the case that
qpL2b = Ω− k
Lq1 < q
∗ and qpH2b = q
∗ ≤ Ω− kHq1
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which implies
(23) q∗ + kHq1 < Ω < q∗ + kLq1.
Since qpL2b = Ω−kLq1 and Ω < q∗+kLq1, then it follows that q
pL
2b < q
∗. As γ → β,
q1 → q∗ and Ω→ q∗
¡
1 + kL
¢
. Since (22) yields
dΩ
dq1
= kL +
2u00(q1)
(1− π)u00
³
qpL2b
´
kL
> kL
as γ increases from β, Ω falls faster than the right-hand inequality in (23). For a
sufficiently high value of γ, call it γ1, the left-hand inequality will bind and beyond
that will be violated. Hence, for γ ∈ (β, γ1] this equilibrium exists. Note, if εL =
εH = 0 this equilibrium cannot exist for any γ.
Equilibrium 2: λp2 > 0 and λ
r
2 = 0 for both states. In this case, q
rH
2b = q
rL
2b = q
∗.
Consequently, Lemma 1 implies that EV 02 (m1 + p1q1s + τ) = Eφ and the first-order
condition of the seller in market 1 implies that 1/p1 = Eφ.
By using the same procedure as before one can show that the solution for q1 is
once again given by (21).
To find the real money balances Ω use (17) to get
2u0 (q1) = (1− π) kL
£
u0
¡
Ω− kLq1
¢
+ 1
¤
+ πkH
£
u0
¡
Ω− kHq1
¢
+ 1
¤
Again a unique value of Ω exists. Using the solutions for Ω and q1 we obtain
qpH2b = Ω− k
Hq1 > q
pL
2b = Ω− k
Lq1
φL =
Ω
ML
, φH =
Ω
MH
and 1/p1 = (1− π)
Ω
ML
+ π
Ω
MH
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For this equilibrium to exist we need that the poor buyers’ money balances satisfy
qpL2b = Ω− k
Lq1 < q
∗ and qpH2b = Ω− k
Hq1 < q
∗
while the rich buyers’ money balances satisfy
Ω+ kLq1 > q
∗ and Ω+ kHq1 > q∗
Combining these two sets of inequalities, the sufficient condition for this equilibrium
is
q∗ − kHq1 < Ω < q∗ + kHq1
At γ1, the right-hand inequality binds. As γ increases above γ1 once again Ω falls
faster than q1. Finally at some γ2 > γ1 the left-hand inequality binds. Thus for
γ ∈ (γ1, γ2] this equilibrium exists.
Equilibrium 3: λpH2 , λ
pL
2 , λ
rH
2 > 0 and λ
rL
2 = 0. In this case, q
rL
2b = q
∗ and
qrH2b , q
pL
2b , q
pH
2b < q
∗. Consequently, Lemma 1 implies that
V 02 (m2) =
1
2p2
£
u0 (qr2b) + 1
¤
Using (12) and (7) yields
(24)
1
p1
=
φH
2kH
©
πkH
£
u0
¡
qrH2b
¢
+ 1
¤
+ 2 (1− π) kL
ª
Then, (14) implies that
V 01 (m1) =
φH
4kH
©
πkH
£
u0
¡
qrH2b
¢
+ 1
¤
+ 2 (1− π) kL
ª £
u0 (q1) + 1
¤
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Finally, (4) can be backdated to get
(25)
4γ
β
=
©
πkH
£
u0
¡
Ω+ φHp1q1
¢
+ 1
¤
+ 2 (1− π) kL
ª £
u0 (q1) + 1
¤
.
where qrH2b = Ω+ φ
Hp1q1.
Then use (17) to get
(26) 2u0 (q1) = πkH
£
u0
¡
Ω− φHp1q1
¢
+ 1
¤
+ (1− π) kL
∙
u0
µ
Ω− k
L
kH
φHp1q1
¶
+ 1
¸
Then solving (24), (25) and (26) yields φHp1, q1 and Ω.
Using the solutions for Ω and q1 we obtain
qrH2b = Ω+ φ
Hp1q1 > q
pH
2b = Ω− φ
Hp1q1 > q
pL
2b = Ω−
kL
kH
φHp1q1
φL =
Ω
ML
, φH =
Ω
MH
For this equilibrium to exist we need that the poor buyers’ money balances satisfy
qpL2b = Ω−
zH
zL
φHp1 < q
∗ and qpH2b = Ω− φ
Hp1q1 < q
∗
while the rich buyers’ money balances satisfy
Ω+ φHp1q1 < q
∗ < Ω+
kL
kH
φHp1q1
Combining these two sets of inequalities, the sufficient condition for this equilibrium
is
q∗ − k
L
kH
φHp1q1 < Ω < q
∗ − φHp1q1
At γ2, the right-hand inequality binds. As γ increases above γ2 once again Ω falls
faster than φHp1q1. Finally at some γ3 > γ2 the left-hand inequality binds. Thus for
γ ∈ (γ2, γ3] this equilibrium exists if a solution to (24), (25) and (26) exists. Note, if
εL = εH = 0 this equilibrium cannot exist for any γ > β.
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Equilibrium 4: λpH2 , λ
pL
2 , λ
rH
2 , λ
rL
2 > 0. In this case, q
pH
2b , q
pL
2b , q
rH
2b , q
rL
2b < q
∗. Con-
sequently, Lemma 1 implies that
V 02 (m2) =
1
2p2
£
u0 (qr2b) + 1
¤
Using (12) and (7) yields
(27)
1
p1
=
φH
2kH
©
πkH
£
u0
¡
qrH2b
¢
+ 1
¤
+ (1− π) kL
£
u0
¡
qrL2b
¢
+ 1
¤ª
Then, (14) implies that
V 01 (m1) =
φH
4kH
©
πkH
£
u0
¡
qrH2b
¢
+ 1
¤
+ (1− π) kL
£
u0
¡
qrL2b
¢
+ 1
¤ª £
u0 (q1) + 1
¤
Finally, (4) can be backdated to get
(28)
4γ
β
=
©
πkH
£
u0
¡
qrH2b
¢
+ 1
¤
+ (1− π) kL
£
u0
¡
qrL2b
¢
+ 1
¤ª £
u0 (q1) + 1
¤
where qrH2b = Ω+ φ
Hp1q1 and qrL2b = Ω+
kL
kH
φHp1q1.
Use (17) to get
(29) u0 (q1) =
πkH
2
£
u0
¡
Ω− φHp1q1
¢
+ 1
¤
+
(1− π) kL
2
∙
u0
µ
Ω− k
L
kH
φHp1q1
¶
+ 1
¸
Then solving (27), (28) and (29) yields φHp1, q1 and Ω.
Using the solutions for Ω and q1 we obtain
qrL2b = Ω+
kL
kH
φHp1q1, qrH2b = Ω+ φ
Hp1q1,
qpH2b = Ω− φ
Hp1q1, q
pL
2b = Ω−
kL
kH
φHp1q1
φL =
Ω
ML
, φH =
Ω
MH
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From theses solutions we get qrL2b > q
rH
2b > q
pH
2b > q
pL
2b .
For this equilibrium to exist we need that the rich buyers’ money balances satisfy
qrL2b = Ω+
kL
kH
φHp1q1 < q
∗
respectively
Ω < q∗ − k
L
kH
φHp1q1
As indicated above this inequality binds at γ3. As γ increases above γ3 once again Ω
falls faster than φHp1q1. Thus for γ ≥ γ3 this equilibrium exists if a solution to (27),
(28) and (29) exists.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that q3 = q∗3 in all states and in all periods.
To ensure that the richest agents have non-negative production we need to impose
that q∗3 ≥ 2q∗. This requires scaling of U (q) such that this condition holds.¥
Proof of Proposition 3. Average aggregate output in market 2 is
π
³
qpL2b + q
rL
2b
´
+ (1− π)
³
qpH2b + q
rH
2b
´
.
Consider all possible equilibria.
In case (i) of Proposition 1 we have qpL2b < q
rL
2b = q
pH
2b = q
rH
2b = q
∗. If an unantic-
ipated increase in money takes place aggregate output realized is qpH2b + q
rH
2b = 2q
∗,
which is higher than average aggregate output since
π
³
qpL2b + q
∗
´
+ (1− π)2q∗ < 2q∗.
In case (ii) of Proposition 1 we know have qpL2b < q
pH
2b < q
rL
2b = q
rH
2b = q
∗. In state
i = H aggregate output is qpH2b + q
∗ > qpL2b + q
∗. Thus
π
³
qpL2b + q
∗
´
+ (1− π)(qpH2b + q
∗) < qpH2b + q
∗
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i.e. aggregate output is larger than average aggregate output if i = H.
In case (iii) of Proposition 1 we have qpL2b < q
pH
2b < q
rH
2b < q
rL
2b = q
∗. We also know
that
qrH2b = Ω+ φ
Hp1q1 > q
pH
2b = Ω− φ
Hp1q1 > q
pL
2b = Ω−
zH
zL
φHp1q1
Thus, in state i = H aggregate output is qpH2b + q
rH
2b = 2Ω. In state i = L we have
qpL2b + q
rL
2b = Ω− k
L
kH
φHp1q1 + q
∗ < Ω− kL
kH
φHp1q1 +Ω+
kL
kH
φHp1q1 = 2Ω
since q∗ < Ω+ k
L
kH
φHp1q1 in this equilibrium. Thus average aggregate output is
π
³
qpL2b + q
rL
2b
´
+ (1− π)2Ω < 2Ω.
i.e. aggregate output is larger than average aggregate output if i = H.
In case (iv) of Proposition 1 we have qpL2b < q
pH
2b < q
rH
2b < q
rL
2b < q
∗. We also know
that
qrL2b = Ω+
kL
kH
φHp1q1 > q
rH
2b = Ω+φ
Hp1q1 > q
pH
2b = Ω−φ
Hp1q1 > q
pL
2b = Ω−
kL
kH
φHp1q1 .
Thus, in state i = H aggregate output is qpH2b + q
rH
2b = 2Ω. In state i = L aggregate
output is qpL2b + q
rL
2b = 2Ω. Thus aggregate output is independent across states and it
is equal to average aggregate output.¥
Proof of Proposition 4. In the low inflation economy, p1 = p2 = 1/φ and the
following equations determine q1 and q
p
2b :
u0(q1) = 1 + 2
γ − β
β
and u0(q1) =
u0
¡
qp2b
¢
+ 1
2
.
Since neither of these expressions depend on x, the quantities q1and q
p
2b are unaffected
by a change in x. For a poor buyer we have p2q
p
2b = M−1 − p1q1 + τp, respectively,
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qp2b + q1 = φ (M−1 + τ
p). If the quantities bought by a poor buyer in markets one
and two do not change then φ (M−1 + τp) must remain the same. Thus,
∂φ
∂x
= − φ (µ− 1)
1 + (µ− 1)x < 0 and
∂φM
∂x
< 0.
The proof for the high inflation economy is by contradiction. In this equilibrium both
buyers spend all of their money in market two. This implies, noting that φ = 1/p2,
the budget constraints satisfy
φ [M−1 + x (γ − 1)M−1] = φp1q1 + qp2b
φ [M−1 + (2− x) (γ − 1)M−1] = −φp1q1 + qr2b
Now add and subtract φ (1− x) (γ − 1)M−1 on the left hand side of the first con-
straint and rewrite the second to get
φ [M − (1− x) (γ − 1)M−1] = φp1q1 + qp2b(30)
φ [M + (1− x) (γ − 1)M−1] = −φp1q1 + qr2b(31)
Now conjecture that a change in x leaves the quantities unchanged. Then it must
also leave φp1 unaffected since
1
φp1
=
V 02 (m1 + p1q1s + τ)
φ
=
1
2
£
u0 (qr2b) + 1
¤
Totally differentiate (30) and (31) holding the right hand sides constant to get
dφ
dx
= − φ (γ − 1)M−1
[M − (1− x) (γ − 1)M−1]
= − φ (γ − 1)
[γ − (1− x) (γ − 1)]
dφ
dx
=
φ (γ − 1)M−1
[M + (1− x) (γ − 1)M−1]
=
φ (γ − 1)
[γ + (1− x) (γ − 1)]
Clearly these expressions are unequal for γ 6= 1. As a result, the quantities must
change.¥
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Proof of Proposition 5. Life-time expected utility of the representative agent
equals
W (1− β) = 1
2
[u (q1)− q1] +
1
4
[u (qr2b)− qr2b] +
1
4
£
u
¡
qp2b
¢
− qp2b
¤
(32)
+U (q∗3)− q∗3
Differentiating with respect to x yields
(33)
∂W (1− β)
∂x
=
1
2
£
u0 (q1)− 1
¤ ∂q1
∂x
+
1
4
£
u0 (qr2b)− 1
¤ ∂qr2b
∂x
+
1
4
£
u0
¡
qp2b
¢
− 1
¤ ∂qp2b
∂x
In this equilibrium all of the quantities are less than q∗ so the bracketed terms are
all positive. We also know qp2b + q
r
2b = φM so
∂qr2b
∂x
=M
∂φ
∂x
− ∂q
p
2b
∂x
Substitute in to obtain
∂W (1− β)
∂x
=
1
2
£
u0 (q1)− 1
¤ ∂q1
∂x
+
1
4
£
u0
¡
qp2b
¢
− u0 (qr2b)
¤ ∂qp2b
∂x
+
1
4
£
u0 (qr2b)− 1
¤
M
∂φ
∂x
To determine dq1dx ,
∂qp2b
∂x , and
dφ
dx note that (27), (28), and (29) must hold with k
H =
kL = 1 and quantities constant across states. Totally differentiate the resulting
expressions and evaluate the derivatives at x = 1. Then solve for dq1dx ,
dφ
dx , and
dp1
dx to
get
dq1
dx
=
1
D
(γ − 1) p1φ2
£
1 + u0 (q1)
¤
u00 (qr2b)u
00 ¡qp2b¢
dφ
dx
=
1
D
µ
γ − 1
γ
¶
φu00 (q1)
£
u00
¡
qp2b
¢
− u00 (qr2b)
¤
where
D = u00 (q1)u
00 ¡qp2b¢+ u00 (q1)u00 (qr2b) + p21φ2u00 (qr2b)u00 ¡qp2b¢ £1 + u0 (q1) + q1u00 (q1)¤
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and we have setM = 1 for simplicity. A sufficient condition for D > 0 is 1+u0 (q1)+
q1u
00 (q1) ≥ 0. This condition is satisfied for any CRRA utility function if the degree
of risk aversion is less or equal to 1.
We then have dq1dx > 0 if γ > 1. Moreover, if
dq1
dx > 0, then
dqr2b
dx < 0 and
dqp2b
dx > 0. Thus, the first two terms of (33) are strictly positive. Since u
000 (.) ≥ 0
we have
£
u00
¡
qp2b
¢
− u00 (qr2b)
¤
≤ 0 which implies that ∂φ∂x > 0 if γ > 1. Consequently,
∂W(1−β)
∂x > 0 if γ > 1. It is straightforward to show that
∂W(1−β)
∂x < 0 if γ < 1.¥
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